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Abstract
Transfers play an important role in modeling International Environmental Agreements
(IEA). We examine the implementation mechanism of Optimal Transfer Sharing Scheme (Car-
raro et al., 2006) which try to enable the existence of stable coalitions for environmental
protection by side transfers. There are many coalitions where the OPTS can possibly be im-
plemented. However, the implementation mechanism is almost impossible as it requests the
°ow of welfare from a few countries to the rest of coalition members, which is unrealistic. If
the joint welfare maximization assumption is replaced with the assumption that the emission
levels of coalition members are uniformly deceased by a constant percentage in comparison to
fully non-cooperative coalition structure, then the free riding incentives are signi¯cantly weak-
ened. As a consequence there are possibilities to implement an OPTS and enable existence of
stable coalitions.
Keywords: stable international environmental agreements, climate policy, coalition forma-
tion, transfers, integrated assessment modeling.
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1 Introduction
The body of literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEA) has two con°icting views.
One view is rooted in the non-cooperative game theory and became the dominant path in the lit-
erature (Barrett, 1994, 2003; Botteon and Carraro, 2001; Osmani and Tol, 2005; Finus et al., 2006;
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1Rubio and Ulph, 2006; McGinty, 2007). The usual approach of non-cooperative game theory to
stable IEAs is based on the idea developed for cartel stability (d'Aspremont et al., 1983) and re-
quires so-called internal and external stability. Internal stability means that a country does not
have an incentive to leave the coalition, while external stability means that a country does not
have an incentive to join the coalition. This part of the literature reaches the conclusion that
the size of a stable coalition is typically very small, thus representing a pessimistic view of global
environmental goods.
The other view is rooted in the cooperative game theory and concludes that the grand coalition (or
at least big coalitions) is stable by implementing ex-ante and ex-post transfers as bene¯ts and costs
from pollution abatement are asymmetric (see Finus (2004) for an overview). Ex-ante implies that
countries commit to a speci¯c transfer rule before they decide upon their participation in a coali-
tion for environmental protection. Ex-post implies that after a stable coalition for environmental
protection has built, transfers are used to expand an existing stable coalition. This represents
an optimistic view of the possibility of international cooperation on solving global environmental
problems.
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) analyze the possibility of enlarging a stable coalition through ex-post
transfers if members refund non-participants for joining the coalition for environmental protection.
An enlargement is considered as successful if it indicates a Pareto improvement to all coalition
members, and if the larger coalition is internally stable despite old signatories transfer some of the
additional welfare gains from cooperation to new coalition members. Their analysis concludes that
self-¯nanced transfers can only enlarge a coalition in the case of heterogeneous countries.
A part of literature uses the °-core concept and implements transfers to solve the asymmetry of
costs and bene¯ts of the countries involved. In order to deter free-riding they assume that after
a deviation, the remaining countries break up into singletons, where each singleton maximizes its
individual payo®.(Chander and Tulkens, 1995, 1997, 2006; Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2003; Chander,
2007).
Jeppesen and Andersen (1998) demonstrate that if some countries are committed to coopera-
tion concerning their abatement implies that this group of countries presupposes a leader role in
forming the coalition. The leading role allows them to evaluate potential aggregate bene¯ts from
increasing the coalition and device side payments to countries that have a follower role in order
to attain optimum membership. Their results are not surprising and commitment is not compati-
ble with the notion of self-enforcing IEAs. Therefore, Botteon and Carraro (1997) show that the
enlargement of coalitions through ex-post transfers may also be possible without commiHoel and
Schneider (1997) integrate a non-environmental cost function from not signing the IEA which they
call "non-material payo®". They ¯nd that, even in the absence of side payments the number of
signatories is not very small.
More recent papers have investigated the e®ect of di®erent transfer schemes on the success of coali-
tion formation (Bosello et al., 2003, 2004; Carraro and Siniscalco, 2001; Eyckmans and Finus, 2004;
Weikart et al., 2006; Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus, 2006). Most of these papers employ integrated
assessment models. They used not only stylized transfer schemes obtained from cooperative game
theory, but also considered schemes that are based on di®erent equity and fairness principles. Their
research stresses that transfers have an essential impact on building of self-enforcing agreements,
but the results are sensible to the design of transfer scheme, model structure and the data set.
This paper use a game-theoretic approach, and Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation
and Distribution (FUND) model (see Section 2) provide the cost-bene¯t functions (payo® func-
tions) of pollution abatements. The main contribution of this research is the analysis of imple-
mentation mechanism of Optimal Transfer Scheme (Carraro et al., 2006). The transfer schemes
2usually presume that there is no free-riding1, or use ad-hoc assumption 2 in order to deter it. On
the opposite, the Optimal Transfers Scheme (OPTS) aims to deter free-riding and enable existence
of stable coalitions. All pro¯table and non-pro¯table Potential Internal Stable Coalitions for two
di®erent year horizons 2005 and 2045 are found3. Potential Internal Stable (PIS) coalitions are
coalitions where the OPTS can be applied. There are few big pro¯table PIS coalitions, but it is
optimistic as there are many non-pro¯table big PIS coalitions. However, the close investigation
of the OPTS transfer scheme for those coalitions shows that it is almost impossible to realize the
OPTS under joint welfare maximization assumption. It is infeasible as the OPTS always requests
the °ow of welfare from a few countries to the rest of the world. No one can imagine an environ-
mental agreement like Kyoto protocol based on a transfer scheme that transfer the welfare from
only a few countries (sometimes only one country) to the rest of the world. However, if the joint
welfare maximization assumption is replaced with the assumption that coalition members reduce
their abatement levels with the same percentage in comparison to fully non-cooperative coalition
structure (all countries are single players), then the free riding incentives are strongly declined. It
follows that an OPTS under the new assumption requests the °ow of welfare from rest of the world
to a few countries, which is realistic. As a result there is space for implementation of OPTS, which
can enable existence of stable coalitions.
In section two the FUND model is brie°y introduced. The next section presents the game-theoretic
model. The fourth section gives a short description of Shapley Value, Nash Bargaining Solution
and Consensus Value. The following section introduces the Potential Internal Stable coalitions and
Optimal Transfer Scheme (OPTS). Section six examines the implementation mechanism of OPTS
and free riding incentives under joint welfare assumption and under assumption that coalition
members decrease their emission levels with the same percentage. The seventh section provides
our conclusions. In Appendix eight our data, results and ¯gures are presented.
2 FUND model
This paper uses version 2.8 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distri-
bution (FUND). Version 2.8 of FUND corresponds to version 1.6, described and applied by Tol
(1999a,b, 2001, 2002c), except for the impact module, which is described by Tol (2002a,b) and
updated by Link and Tol (2004). A further di®erence is that the current version of the model
distinguishes 16 instead of 9 regions. Finally, the model considers emission reduction of methane
and nitrous oxide as well as carbon dioxide, as described by Tol (2006).
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous perturbations. The
model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United States of America (USA),
Canada (CAN), Western Europe (WEU), Japan and South Korea (JPK), Australia and New
Zealand (ANZ), Central and Eastern Europe (EEU), the former Soviet Union (FSU), the Middle
East (MDE), Central America (CAM), South America (LAM), South Asia (SAS), Southeast Asia
(SEA), China (CHI), North Africa (NAF), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and Small Island States
(SIS). The model runs from 1950 to 2300 in time steps of one year. The primary reason for start-
ing in 1950 is to initialize the climate change impact module. The period of 1950-1990 is used for
the calibration of the model, which is based on the IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes and Gold-
ewijk, 1994). The period 1990-2000 is based on observations of the World Resources Databases
(W.R.I., 2001). The climate scenarios for the period 2010-2100 are based on the EMF14 Stan-
dardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in between IS92a and IS92f (Leggett et al., 1992). The
1Such as Shapley Value, Nash Bargaining Solution and Consensus Value.
2Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997) use the ° core concept and assume that the coalition breaks down if a
coalition member free-rides.
3The data for year horizon 2025 are sometimes used.
32000-2010 period is interpolated from the immediate past, and the period 2100-2300 extrapolated.
The scenarios are de¯ned by the rates of population growth, economic growth, autonomous en-
ergy e±ciency improvements as well as the rate of decarbonization of the energy use (autonomous
carbon e±ciency improvements), and emissions of carbon dioxide from land use change, methane
and nitrous oxide. The scenarios of economic and population growth are perturbed by the impact
of climatic change. Population decreases with increasing climate change related deaths that result
from changes in heat stress, cold stress,malaria, and tropical cyclones.
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide,
methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean surface temperature, the impact of carbon diox-
ide emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, and the impact of the damages to the
economy and the population caused by climate change. Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in
the atmosphere, and then geometrically depleted. The atmospheric concentration of carbon diox-
ide, measured in parts per million by volume, is represented by the ¯ve-box model of Maier-Reimer
and Hasselmann (1987). Its parameters are taken from Hammitt et al. (1992). The model also
contains sulphur emissions (Tol, 2006).
The climate impact module, based on Tol (2002b,c) includes the following categories: agriculture,
forestry, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders related to cold and heat stress,
malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy consumption, water resources, and un-
managed ecosystems. Climate change related damages can be attributed to either the rate of
change (benchmarked at 0:04±C) or the level of change (benchmarked at 1:0±C).
2.1 Welfare function of FUND model
For the analysis of coalition formation, we approximate the FUND model with a linear quadratic
structure. Speci¯cally, the abatement cost function is represented as:
Ci = ®iR2
iYi (1)
where C denotes cost, R relative emission reduction, and Y gross domestic product; i indexes





where B denotes bene¯t and E unabated emissions. Tables 19, 20 and 21 in Appendix give the
parameters of Equations (1) and (2) for years 2005, 2025 and 2045 as estimated by or speci¯ed in
FUND. Moreover the pro¯t P is given as:





Non-cooperative optimal emission reduction is then:
dPi=dR = ¯iEi ¡ 2®iRiYi = 0 ) Ri = ¯iEi=(2®iYi) (4)
If region i is in a coalition with region j, optimal emission reduction is:
dPi+j=dRi = 0 ) Ei(¯i + ¯j) ¡ 2®iRiYi = 0 ) Ri = (¯i + ¯j)Ei=(2®iYi) (5)
The price for entering a coalition is therefore higher emission abatement at home. The return is
that the coalition partners also raise their abatement e®orts.
4Note that our welfare functions are orthogonal, this indicates that the emissions change of a country
do not a®ect the marginal bene¯ts of other countries (independence assumption). In our game,
countries outside the coalition bene¯t from the reduction in emissions achieved by the cooperating
countries but they cannot a®ect the bene¯ts derived by the members of the coalition. As our cost-
bene¯t function are orthogonal our approach does not capture the e®ects of emissions leakage.
But our cost bene¯t function are su±ciently realistic as they are approximation of complex model
FUND and our procedure of dealing with farsighted stability is general and appropriate for non-
orthogonal functions also.
3 Our model
There are 16 world regions (we name the set of all regions by N16) in our game theoretic model
of IEA's (or coalitions), which are shown in ¯rst column of Table 19. At the ¯rst level, the link
between the economic activity and the physical environment is established in order to generate the
economical-ecological model. This link is established through a social welfare function of FUND
model, see 3. The social welfare function captures the di®erence between the pro¯t from pollution
and the environmental damage. Following this approach, countries play a two stage-game. In the
¯rst stage, each country decides to join the coalition C µ N16 and become a signatory (or coalition
member) or stay singleton and non-signatory (membership game). These decisions lead to coalition
structure S with c coalition-members (c denotes the cardinality of C) and 16-c non-members. A
coalition structure simply fully describes how many coalitions (at the moment we assume that we
have one coalition) are formed, how many members each coalition has and how many singleton
players are. Given the simple coalition structure S is fully characterized by coalition C. In the
second stage, every country decides on emissions (strategic game). Within the coalition, players
play cooperatively (by maximizing their joint welfare) while the coalition and single countries
compete in a non cooperative way (by maximizing their own welfare). Every coalition C is assigned
a real number À(C) (called characteristic function).
De¯nition 3.1 By the characteristic function of our 16-player game (played by c and 16 ¡ c
players, where c is cardinality of coalition C) we mean a real-valued function À(C) : C ! R;
À(C) = max(
Pc
1 ¼i) 8i 2 C; C ½ N16; c · 16:
Characteristic function is simple the total pro¯t that coalition-member reach by maximizing their
joint welfare. As ¼ are strictly concave, their sum is strictly concave also, which simpli¯es the
maximization problem. The game satis¯es the superadditivity property:
De¯nition 3.2 A game is superadditive if for any two coalitions, C1 ½ N16 and C2 ½ N16 :
À(C1 [ C2) > À(C1) + À(C2) C1 \ C2 = ;:
The superadditivity property means that if C1 and C2 are disjoint coalitions (here C1 and C2 can
be single players too), it is clear that they should accomplish at least as much as by joining forces
as by remaining separate. But the game almost always (with some exceptions) exhibits positive
spillovers:
De¯nition 3.3 A game exhibits positive spillover property if and only if for any two coalitions
C1 ½ N16 and C2 ½ N16 such as C1 * C2 and C2 * C1 we have:
8k = 2 C1 [ C2 Àk(C1 [ C2) > Àk(C1) ^ Àk(C1 [ C2) > Àk(C2)
It indicates that there is an external gain (C1 and C2 can be single players too) or a positive
spillover from cooperation, making free-riding (i.e., not joining C1 [C2) attractive. It just implies
that every player k = 2 C1[C2 has higher pro¯t when two coalitions C1 and C2 cooperate compared
5to the situation where two coalitions stay separated. It indicates that from a non-signatory's point
of view (player k here), the most favorable situation is the one in which all other countries take
part in the coalition (except k). As we have already mentioned the positive spillover property is
almost always satis¯ed with the exception of some coalitions that contain as members Japan &
South Korea or Australia & New Zealand which have negative marginal bene¯ts (negative ¯'s)
from pollution abatement.
4 Di®erent sharing schemes
This section presents shortly Shapley Value, Nash Bargaining solution and Consensus Value.
4.1 Shapley Value
Suppose we form a coalition C by entering the players into this coalition one at a time; À(C) is
the characteristic function of coalition C, see de¯nition 3.1; jCj is cardinality of coalition C, and
n is total number of players. As each player enters the coalition, he receives the amount by which
his entry increases the value of the coalition he enters. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is just
the average payo® to the players if the players are entered in completely random order.




(jCj ¡ 1)!(n ¡ jCj)!
n!
(À(C) ¡ À(C ¡ fig)) (6)
The interpretation of this formula is as follows. Suppose we choose a random order of the players
with all n! orders (permutations) of the players equally likely. Then we enter the players according
to this order. If, when player i enters, he forms coalition C (that is, if he ¯nds C ¡ fig there
already), he receives the amount (À(C) ¡ À(C ¡ fig)). The probability that when i enters he
will ¯nd coalition C ¡ fig there already is
(jCj¡1)!(n¡jCj)!
n! . The denominator is the total number
of permutations of the n players. The numerator is number of these permutations in which the
jCj ¡ 1 members of C ¡ fig come ¯rst ((jCj ¡ 1)! ways), then player i, and then the remaining
n ¡ jCj players ((n ¡ jCj)! ways). So this formula shows that Ái(À) is just the average amount
player i contributes to the coalitions if the players sequentially form those coalitions in a random
order (and in all possible ways).
4.2 Nash Bargaining solution
The axiomatic theory of bargaining originated in a fundamental paper by Nash (1950). If a part
(or all) of countries (suppose that there are n countries) agree to form a coalition and behave
cooperatively and the rest of countries optimize their own welfare function. The scenario is that
n world regions have access to any of the alternatives in some set <n, called the feasible utility
set. Their preferences over the alternatives in the utility set are given by welfare function Pi, see
equation 3.
If no coalition is formed, they end up at a pre-speci¯ed alternative in the feasible set called the
disagreement point, which is denoted by vector d. In our model d is pro¯t vector of atom struc-
ture with n elements where every country optimize his own pro¯ts. More formally, a bargaining
problem is de¯ned by the tuple (<n;d) where the utility set (<n) has to be (and is) a non-empty,
convex, and compact subset. We further assume that there exists an p 2 <n, such that p À d. In
our case, Nash bargaining solution, denoted fN(<n;d) is given by
6fN(<n;d) = argmax
Q
i=1:::n(Pi ¡ di) where Pi = Bi ¡ Ci = ¯i
Pn
j RjEj ¡ ®iR2
iYi
This means simply we need to ¯nd the abatement level R of n coalition members that maxi-
mize fN (as Pi is function of R). Note than the abatement level R of ten remaining countries are
known as they simply maximize their own welfare function (we need them in order to calculate




Let us consider an arbitrary 2-person cooperative TU game with player set N = f1;2g and char-
acteristic function v determined by the values: v(f1g);v(f2g) and v(f1;2g). A reasonable solution
is that player 1 gets:
v(f1g) + [v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f1g) ¡ v(f2g)]=2
and player 2 gets:
v(f2g) + [v(f1;2g) ¡ v(f2g) ¡ v(f1g)]=2
That is, the (net) surplus generated by the cooperation between player 1 and 2, v(f1;2g)¡v(f2g)¡
v(f1g), is equally shared between the two players. This solution is called the standard solution for
2-person cooperative games. Ju et al. (2004) provide a generalization of the standard solution for
2-person games into n-person cases. Consider a n-person game (N;v) while the grand coalition
Cn = f1;2;::;ng is formed than the player (n+1) (let call the new player just player (n+1)) joins
the coalition and the coalition Cn+1 = f1;2;::;n;n + 1g is formed. The generalization of player
(n + 1) share is:
v(fn + 1g)
| {z }
v of the single player (n+1)
+ [v(f1;:::;n + 1g) ¡ v(fn + 1g) ¡ v(f1;::;ng)]
| {z }
the surplus from cooperation of Cn and player (n+1)
¢1=2
The interpretation of above formula is as follows. We can see the above situation as 2-person
game. The coalition Cn = f1;2;::;ng is considered as one player and the next player is the new
player (n + 1) that joins the coalition. The (net) surplus generated by the cooperation between
coalition Cn and the new player is v(f1;:::;n+1g)¡v(fn+1g)¡v(f1;::;ng). The equation above
says that the new player take the amount he gets alone v(fn + 1g) plus the half of the surplus.
v(fi j i 2 Cng)
| {z }
v of a member of Cn
+ [v(f1;:::;n + 1g) ¡ v(fn + 1g) ¡ v(f1;::;ng)]
| {z }
the surplus from cooperation of Cn and player (n+1)
¢1=2 ¢ 1=n
Each of n-players that was already in coalition Cn gets his payo® as member of coalition Cn
plus half of the surplus divided by n.
5 Optimal Transfer Sharing Scheme
I will begin by introducing de¯nition of Potentially Internally Stable coalition (Botteon and Car-
raro, 1997; Eyckmans and Finus, 2004; Carraro et al., 2006):





¼i(C n fig) 8i 2 C
² ¼i is pro¯t of country i, ¼i(C) refers to situations with country i is member of coalition C,
and ¼i(C n fig) with country i as free-rider.
Consequently a coalition C is PIS if it generates su±cient welfare to distribute each of its members
at least its free riding payo®. Thus, if C is PIS there exist a transfer scheme which guarantees
internal stability to all members of S. Such a transfer scheme is constructed by donating every
member of S at least his free-rider payo® ¼i(C n fig).
De¯nition 5.2 A transfer scheme is called optimal if it satis¯es:
² 8 C µ N; 8i 2 C : ¼i









j2C ¸j = 1g.
It is evident that any transfer scheme which belongs to the class of optimal transfer scheme (OPTS)
will make any PIS coalition internally stable. It is easy to see that there is much freedom in choosing
weights ¸(C). Provided that the surplus of cooperation exceeds the free-riding payo®s, as well as
all weights ¸(C), are positive, the following allocation will be internally stable independent of the
choice of weights.
It is essential to note that sharing schemes always assume that free-riding is deterred (like Shapley
Value, Nash bargaining solution and Consensus Value), and share the emissions burden. On the
opposite, the OPTS aims to deter free-riding and enable existence of stable coalitions.
6 Burden Sharing Emissions in Potentially Internally Stable
Coalitions
The number of big pro¯table Potentially Internal Stable (PIS) Coalitions for years 2005 and 2045
is small (only one coalition with 5 members), while the number of big non-pro¯table Potentially
Internal Stable Coalitions for years 2005 and 2045 is large, see Table 1 and Table 2. It is an
optimistic result as there are a lot of non-pro¯table coalitions that are PIS. But, as I am going
to clarify below, there are still hidden barriers for the implementation of OPTS. Our numerical
computation advices us to distinguish two di®erent situations; the ¯rst situation when coalition
members maximize their joint welfare and the second situation when coalition members decrease
uniformly their emission levels by a constant percentage.
Let me begin with the situation under joint welfare maximization assumption. Assume we have
the 10-members coalition (USA, CAN, JPK, ANZ, EEU, FSU, LAM, SAS, CHI, SIS) which I have
inspected that is PIS. Coalition members can be divided in two types; type one, the countries that
have no incentive to free-ride; type two, the countries that have incentives to free-ride. China
(CHI) and USA have no incentives to free-ride, while the rest of countries has incentives to free-
ride, see Table 3. It is evident that the majority of countries have incentives to free-ride. The ¯rst
type of countries increases slightly their abatement levels when the coalition is formed. On the
other hand, indirectly force other countries (second type of countries) to increase their abatement
levels signi¯cantly, as it is less expensive to reduce emissions in second type countries compare to
the ¯rst type countries (because of economic structure). This becomes clear when we compare the
abatement levels of our coalition members with China and without China as a coalition member,
see Table 4. Table 4 shows that the abatement levels of every coalition member are at least doubled
when China is a coalition member in comparison to the situation when China is not a coalition
member. On the other hand, China increases its abatement level only by 50 %. So, in the PIS
8coalitions the welfare is transferred from the second type countries (all coalition members except
China and USA) to the ¯rst type of countries (China and USA in our coalition) when the OPTS
is not applied. As a consequence this leaves the burden emissions, mostly at the country of second
types, where is less expensive to reduce pollution. On the opposite side, the OPTS transfers
welfare from China and USA to the rest of coalition member in order to deter free riding, and this
is a general feature and the main drawback of OPTS when joint welfare maximization assumption
is applied. With general feature, I mean that it does not depend on our setting and FUND
model, while with main drawback, I indicate that it is impossible to realize the OPTS scheme
under joint welfare maximization assumption. One cannot imagine any realistic International
Environmental Agreements that have as an essential argument distributing its welfare from a few
countries (sometime only one country) to the rest of world. In order to illustrate further my
argument, I have presented some other coalitions where the same analysis is valid, see Tables 5, 6,
7 and 8. The joint welfare maximization generates not only the largest welfare4 but also generates
strong incentives to free ride, which make OPTS impossible to implement.
There is no 13-members PIS coalition in year 2005, where USA, WEU, FSU and CHI are coalition-
members simultaneously, and there is only one coalition that contains three of them, namely USA,
FSU, CHI as coalition member, see Table 13. As a consequence the OPTS usually leaves out two of
the essential player of games of climate change. A simple numerical exercise is performed in order
to receive some possible explanations why it is hard to have three of big players in one coalition.
I take the 13 member PIS coalition of Table 7, and add WEU as coalition member. It is checked
that the resulting 14 member coalition is not PIS, see Table 9 for pro¯t of coalition members as
free-riders. Table 10 presents the abatement levels of coalition members that are raised by 50 %
when WEU is a coalition member in comparison to the situation when WEU is not a coalition
member. On the opposite WEU tripled its abatement level. When CHI is a member of 13-member
PIS coalition (but WEU not), it realizes su±cient welfare to compensate the gains from free-riding
of the rest of coalition members. As it is already explained this happened as the rest of coalition
member almost tripled their abatement levels, while China only raises with 50 %. However, as
coalition members have tripled their abatement levels their marginal abatement costs are increased,
and as a consequence it is not any longer cheaper to reduce the pollution in those countries. And
¯nally there is no more space for WEU to realize welfare and compensate the free-riders.
There are only few really big pro¯table (only one 5 member coalition in year 2045, see Tables 11
and 12) coalitions, which are potentially internal stable, because in most pro¯table coalitions every
country has an incentive to free ride, which implies that they cannot be usually potentially internal
stable. It is clear than an OPTS for pro¯table coalitions has the same drawbacks as an OPTS for
non-pro¯table coalitions.
If the joint welfare optimization assumption is replaced with the assumption that the emission levels
of coalition members are uniformly reduced by a constant percentage term5 in comparison to fully
non-cooperative coalition structure then, the number of countries that pro¯t from free riding is
drastically reduced. This implies that there is space for implementation of OPTS schemes. Tables
14, 15 and 16 show that for 15 member PIS coalitions (which are the largest PIS coalitions) in
year horizons 2005, 2025 and 2045, there are at most two countries that have incentives to free-
ride6. These are favorable circumstances for implementation of OPTS, as the welfare transfers
occur from majority of world regions to some of the world regions. This sounds realistic, and a
4The hessian matrix of second derivatives of welfare functions is negative de¯nite, so we have a unique maximum
for welfare.
5All results that are presented to this paper, coalition members reduce uniformly their emission levels by 50%.
Even so, I have performed other numerical computations when coalition members decrease their emissions level by
30%. The results are qualitatively similar when coalition members reduce their emissions level by 50% or 30%.
6The 15 member coalitions for year 2045 have no country that has an incentive to free-ride. It implies that they
are already stable coalitions and no OPTS is needed.
9coalition for environmental protection can work in this way. Furthermore, there are two 15 member
coalitions, which are simultaneously PIS coalitions during all year horizons 2005, 2025 and 2045.
This indicates that OPTS scheme can possibly build incentives for almost all countries7 of the
world to take part in coalitions for environmental protection. Clearly, the last conclusion depends
on FUND model structure and assumptions. In order to receive a rough measure of free-riding
incentives, we calculated the number of free-riders for 10 member coalitions for year horizons 2005,
2025 and 2045, see Table 17. The ¯rst column of Table 17 presents di®erent year horizons 2005,
2025 and 2045. The second column of Table 17, Ct displays the total number of 10 member
coalitions, while the third column Cp presents the total number of PIS coalitions. The columns
four to nine displays the number of PIS coalition with equal number of free riders; the column four,
CPFr=0 presents the number of coalitions with no free riders, and column nine, CPFr=9 presents
the number of coalitions with nine riders. Table 17 shows that there are many PIS coalitions,
and more than half of them have at most two countries that have incentives to free-ride. This
indicates that there is a big space for implementation of OPTS schemes, which requests the °ow of
welfare from majority of world regions to few of them. This sounds reasonable and is quite feasible.
Table 18 is identical with Table 17 but it presents numerical results for 8 member coalitions. The
same conclusions as for 10 member coalitions of Table 17 hold. The uniformed reduction emissions
level assumption does not generate the largest possible welfare, but it reduces considerably the
incentives to free ride, which makes OPTS possible to implement.
7 Conclusions
The paper investigates the PIS coalitions and the OPTS. The common transfer schemes like Shap-
ley Value, Nash Bargaining solution and Consensus Value assumes there is no free-riding while
OPTS try to deter free-riding and enable the existence of internal stable coalitions. FUND model
provides the cost-bene¯t functions for our game theoretic approach.
There are many non-pro¯table PIS coalitions but only few big pro¯table coalitions. In spite that
there are many PIS coalitions, the implementation of the OPTS scheme within these coalitions
is impossible when joint welfare maximization assumption is applied. The OPTS scheme transfer
the welfare from a few countries (that have no incentive to free-ride) to the rest of countries (that
have incentives to free-ride) which is an almost an impossible task. On the other hand, the PIS
coalitions usually do not have simultaneously as coalition members some essential players of cli-
mate change like: USA, WEU, China or FSU. This is another shortcoming of OPTS under joint
welfare maximization assumption.
Nevertheless, if the joint welfare maximization assumption is substituted with the assumption that
coalition members decrease uniformly their abatement levels by the same percentage compared to
fully non-cooperative coalition structure, then the free riding incentives are considerably decreased.
As a result there is space for implementation of OPTS. The main conclusion of our analysis is that,
the OPTS scheme can enable existence of stable coalitions and deter free riding only if joint welfare
maximization assumption is replaced by assumption that coalition members equally reduce their
emissions by the same percentage.
Further research is necessary in order to incorporate future in the decision process, equity prefer-
ences, other integrate assessment models and political commitment to cooperation.




¼i(C nfig) stay (see de¯nition 5.1 of PIS coalitions) in interval 10¡3 ¡ 2 ¢ 10¡3, which is a small value.
108 Appendix
Table 1: Number of pro¯table coalitions which are potentially internally stable.
Y ear P9 P8 P7 P6 P5 P4 P3
Year 2005 - - - 0 0 5 (from 15) 16 (from 16)
Year 2045 0 0 0 0 1 (form 90) 38 (from 106) 64 (from 65)
Table 2: Number of non-pro¯table coalitions which are potentially internally stable.
Y ear P16 P15 P14 P13 P12 P11 P10 P9 P8 P7 P6 P5
Year 2005 0 0 0 23 266 1220 3172 5336 6436 6115 4929 3923
Year 2045 0 0 0 0 8 111 531 1480 2723 3553 3456 2407
Table 3: Pro¯t P of coalition members (Cmemb) in year 2045, for a 10 member non-pro¯table
coalition which is potentially internal stable, when coalition is formed (Pcoal), and when coalition
members free-ride (Pfreerid).
Cmemb USA CAN JPK ANZ EEU FSU LAM SAS CHI SIS
Pcoal 1.23 0.08 0.04 0.06 -0.02 -1.51 0.15 -0.06 4.8 0.04
Pfreerid 1.21 0.1 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.4 0.19 0.36 2.15 0.08
Table 4: Relative emission reduction R of coalition members (Cmemb) in year 2045, for a 10
member non-pro¯table coalition which is potentially internal stable, when China is a coalition-
member (RCHI ¡ in), and when China is not a coalition-member (RCHI ¡ out).
Cmemb USA CAN JPK ANZ EEU FSU LAM SAS CHI SIS
RCHI¡in 0.03 0.03 0.011 0.03 0.08 0.27 0.025 0.1 0.09 0.12
RCHI¡out 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.009 0.03 0.06 0.04
11Table 5: Pro¯t P of coalition members (Cmemb) in year 2045, for a 12 member non-pro¯table
coalition which is potentially internal stable, when coalition is formed (Pcoal), and when coalition
members free-ride(Pfreerid).
Cmemb CAN JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI SSA SIS
Pcoal 0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.12 0.05 0.08 -0.16 0.22 2.46 0.23 0.01
Pfreerid 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.11 0.2 0.31 1.38 0.26 0.05
Table 6: Relative emission reduction R of coalition members (Cmemb) in year 2045, for a 12
member non-pro¯table coalition which is potentially internal stable, when China is a coalition-
member (RCHI¡in), and when China is not a coalition-member (RCHI¡out).
Cmemb CAN JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI SSA SIS
RCHI¡in 0.026 0.01 0.028 0.074 0.093 0.042 0.023 0.089 0.041 0.083 0.047 0.11
RCHI¡out 0.008 0.003 0.009 0.023 0.028 0.013 0.007 0.027 0.013 0.058 0.014 0.03
Table 7: Pro¯t P of coalition members (Cmemb) in year 2005, for a 13 member non-pro¯table
coalition which is potentially internal stable, when coalition is formed (Pcoal), and when coalition
members free-ride(Pfreerid).
Cmemb CAN JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA SIS
Pcoal 0.03 -0.87 -0.04 -0.004 -0.2 0.009 0.11 -0.1 0.31 1.64 0.47 0.51 0.009
Pfreerid 0.048 -0.77 -0.03 0.05 0.02 0.034 0.13 0.15 0.33 0.98 0.44 0.47 0.03
Table 8: Relative emission reduction R of coalition members (Cmemb) in year 2005, for a a 13
member non-pro¯table coalition which is potentially internal stable, when China is a coalition-
member (RCHI¡in), and when China is not a coalition-member (RCHI¡out).
Cmemb CAN JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA SIS
RCHI¡in 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.16
RCHI¡out 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.05
12Table 9: Pro¯t P of coalition members (Cmemb) in year 2005, for a 14 member non-pro¯table coali-
tion which is not potentially internal stable, when coalition is formed (Pcoal), and when coalition
members free-ride(Pfreerid).
Cmemb CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA SIS
Pcoal 0.04 2.31 -1.12 -0.06 -0.05 -0.45 -0.005 0.14 -0.36 0.39 1.85 0.6497 0.7 -0.002
Pfreerid 0.07 1.66 -1.19 -0.04 0.07 0.03 0.049 0.19 0.22 0.49 1.53 0.6498 0.71 0.04
Table 10: Relative emission reduction R of coalition members (Cmemb) in year 2005, for a 14 mem-
ber non-pro¯table coalition which is not potentially internal stable, when Western European Union
(WEU) is a coalition-member (RWEU¡in), and when WEU is not a coalition-member (RWEU¡out).
Cmemb CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA SIS
RWEU¡in 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.24 0.1 0.05 0.23 0.1 0.2 0.16 0.16 0.24
RWEU¡out 0.03 0.006 0.01 0.04 0.1 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.16
Table 11: Pro¯t P of coalition members (Cmemb) in year 2045, for a 5 member pro¯table coalition
which is potentially internal stable, when coalition is formed (Pcoal), and when coalition members
free-ride(Pfreerid).
Cmemb USA CAN ANZ LAM SEA
Pcoal 0.37 0.025 0.019 0.047 0.14
Pfreerid 0.36 0.026 0.02 0.049 0.143
Table 12: Relative emission reduction R of coalition members (Cmemb) in year 2045, for a 5
member non-pro¯table coalition which is potentially internal stable, when USA is coalition-member
(RUSA¡in), and when USA is not coalition-member (RUSA¡out).
Cmemb USA CAN ANZ LAM SEA
RUSA¡in 0.008 0.0075 0.008 0.007 0.012
RUSA¡out 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005
13Table 13: All 13-member non-pro¯table coalitions which are potentially internal stable for year
2005. There is no coalition where USA, WEU, CHI and FSU participate simultaneously, and there
are only two coalitions, where three of them (namely USA, FSU and CHI) takes part simultane-
ously.
CAN JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA SIS
CAN JPK ANZ EEU FSU CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA SIS
CAN JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA SIS
CAN JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SEA CHI NAF SSA SIS
CAN JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS CHI NAF SSA SIS
CAN JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA NAF SSA SIS
CAN JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI SSA SIS
CAN JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SIS
CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA NAF SSA SIS
CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SIS
CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS NAF SSA SIS
CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA SSA SIS
CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA NAF SIS
USA CAN JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS CHI NAF SSA SIS
USA CAN JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA NAF SSA SIS
USA CAN JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI SSA SIS
USA CAN JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SIS
USA CAN JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS NAF SSA SIS
USA CAN JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS CHI NAF SIS
USA CAN JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA SSA SIS
USA CAN JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA NAF SIS
USA CAN JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI SIS
14Table 14: Number of 15 member coalitions which are potentially internally stable in year 2005, as
well as free-riding members in bold letters, when coalition members decrease equally the abatement
levels by 50 %.
CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA SIS
USA CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA SIS
USA CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA NAF SSA SIS
Table 15: Number of 15 member coalitions which are potentially internally stable in year 2025,
as well as the free-riding members in bold letters when coalition members decrease equally the
abatement levels by 50 %.
CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA SIS
USA CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA SIS
USA CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA NAF SSA SIS
Table 16: Number of 15 member coalitions which are potentially internally stable in year 2045,
as well as the free-riding members in bold letters when coalition members decrease equally the
abatement levels by 50 %.
USA CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA CHI NAF SSA SIS
USA CAN WEU JPK ANZ EEU FSU MDE CAM LAM SAS SEA NAF SSA SIS
15Table 17: Number of 10 member coalitions which are potentially internally stable, and the number
of free-riding members when coalition members decrease equally the abatement levels by 50 %.
Y ear Ct CP CPFr=0 CPFr=1 CPFr=2 CPFr=3 CPFr=4 CPFr=5
Year 2005 8008 1709 0 516 809 384 0 0
Year 2025 8008 1830 0 603 753 364 110 0
Year 2045 8008 2884 0 495 1483 846 60 0
Table 18: Number of 8 member coalitions which are potentially internally stable, and the number
of free-riding members when coalition members decrease equally the abatement levels by 50 %.
Y ear Ct CP CPFr=0 CPFr=1 CPFr=2 CPFr=3 CPFr=4 CPFr=5 CPFr=6 CPFr=7 CPFr=8
2005 12870 3279 0 434 1686 1124 14 0 14 7 0
2025 12870 2677 0 743 1332 541 61 0 0 0 0
2045 12870 2453 0 712 1439 302 0 0 0 0 0
16Table 19: Our data from year 2005, ® abatement cost parameter (unitless), ¯ marginal damage
costs of carbon dioxide emissions (in dollars per tonne of carbon) E carbon dioxide emissions (in
billion metric tonnes of carbon) Y gross domestic product, in billion US dollar. Source: FUND
.
® ¯ E Y
USA 0.01515466 2.19648488 1.647 10399
CAN 0.01516751 0.09315600 0.124 807
WEU 0.01568000 3.15719404 0.762 12575
JPK 0.01562780 -1.42089104 0.525 8528
ANZ 0.01510650 -0.05143806 0.079 446
EEU 0.01465218 0.10131831 0.177 407
FSU 0.01381774 1.27242378 0.811 629
MDE 0.01434659 0.04737632 0.424 614
CAM 0.01486421 0.06652486 0.115 388
LAM 0.01513700 0.26839935 0.223 1351
SAS 0.01436564 0.35566631 0.559 831
SEA 0.01484894 0.73159104 0.334 1094
CHI 0.01444354 4.35686225 1.431 2376
NAF 0.01459959 0.96627119 0.101 213
SSA 0.01459184 1.07375825 0.145 302
SIS 0.01434621 0.05549814 0.038 55
17Table 20: Our data from year 2025, ® abatement cost parameter (unitless), ¯ marginal damage
costs of carbon dioxide emissions (in dollars per tonne of carbon) E carbon dioxide emissions (in
billion metric tonnes of carbon), Y gross domestic product (in billion US dollar). Source: FUND
® ¯ E Y
USA 0.015229 1.76 1.926 16199
CAN 0.015244 0.1 0.146 1277
WEU 0.015646 2.86 0.889 18781
JPK 0.01568 -0.44 0.676 14408
ANZ 0.015196 0.03 0.102 785
EEU 0.014777 0.11 0.262 780
FSU 0.013979 0.95 1.339 1249
MDE 0.014528 0.26 0.690 1335
CAM 0.014985 0.12 0.160 733
LAM 0.015216 0.22 0.310 2519
SAS 0.01458 0.39 0.883 1858
SEA 0.014967 0.64 0.575 2535
CHI 0.014666 5.56 2.228 5420
NAF 0.014853 0.71 0.139 481
SSA 0.014865 0.64 0.196 694
SIS 0.014498 0.07 0.058 107
18Table 21: Our data from year 2045, ® abatement cost parameter (unitless), ¯ marginal damage
costs of carbon dioxide emissions (in dollars per tonne of carbon) E carbon dioxide emissions (in
billion metric tonnes of carbon), Y gross domestic product (in billion US dollar). Source: FUND
® ¯ E Y
USA 0.015241 1.33 2.402 22029
CAN 0.015253 0.09 0.183 1739
WEU 0.01559 2.35 1.111 25495
JPK 0.01568 0.07 0.846 20794
ANZ 0.015229 0.07 0.128 1136
EEU 0.014842 0.1 0.414 1429
FSU 0.014107 0.71 2.093 2281
MDE 0.01473 0.33 0.976 2707
CAM 0.015084 0.13 0.222 1332
LAM 0.015291 0.17 0.429 4554
SAS 0.014753 0.37 1.224 3545
SEA 0.015088 0.51 0.795 4826
CHI 0.014785 5.28 3.428 10560
NAF 0.015029 0.51 0.192 1005
SSA 0.015039 0.41 0.271 1456
SIS 0.014648 0.07 0.082 196
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